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Davis: Divided Damages - The Albatross of the Modern Mariner.

DIVIDED DAMAGES-THE ALBATROSS OF
THE MODERN MARINER
HOWARD E. DAVIS, Jr.
In 1854 the Supreme Court of the United States issued its historic
opinion in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson.1 The litigation concerned an off-shore collision between two schooners-the Catharine
and the San Luis-in which there was a significant disparity in the

amount of fault attributable to each ship. The Court, taking cognizance of the settled English rule' and the prevailing practice of dividing damages,8 decided that the rule for collision cases in the United
States would be to divide the damages equally between the culpable
ships.4 Justice Nelson, speaking for the majority, felt that such a departure from the common law principle5 was necessary to provide just
and equitable results in admiralty litigation as well as to insure the utmost vigilance and care in maritime navigation. 6
1. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
2. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854).
The English rule was developed as we know it today-divided damages among two
wrongdoing vessels regardless of degree of culpability-in the decision promulgated by
the House of Lords in Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395, 400 (H.L. 1824), cited in N.M.
Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd,
324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).
3. Id. at 177.
4. Id. at 177-78.
5. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971). At common law a plaintiff was denied recovery from a negligent defendant because plaintiffs own action, as
a contributing cause to the injury suffered, disabled his claim for recovery. See also
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 691 (1893).
6. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1854).
The English admiralty had adopted the principle of equal division of damages in order
to avoid the harsh realities of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. Hay
v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395, 400 (H.L. 1824). The rule itself was found in the early maritime codes of the twelfth century but its application was restricted to accidental or "unwitting" collisions. Donovan and Ray, Mutual Fault-Half-DamagesRule-A Critical
Analysis, 41 INS. COUN. J. 359, 402 (1974). The Maritime Codes of the Mediterranean
City States provided for the division of damages in cases of inscrutable fault or inevitable accident. Comment, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 15, 23 (1928). With
the exception of a few minor modifications the rule of divided damages has changed
little in the succeeding years since Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395 (H.L. 1824). As cultural descendants and recent members of the British Empire, it was not illogical or unlikely that the United States should adopt the policies of the world's then most influential maritime-mercantile power. Several federal district courts had adopted the rule soon
after its promulgation in England. The Scioto, Fed. Cas. # 12,508 (D. Me. 1847);
The Rival, Fed. Cas. # 11,867 (D. Mass. 1846).
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The divided damages rule holds that where both vessels involved in
a collision are at fault then each party is responsible for one-half of the
total damages regardless of its respective degree of blame. 7 Thus,
the least injured party must pay to the more severely damaged a portion of his damages.8 In essence the rule contains the same defect as
the doctrine of contributory negligence-no provision is made for consideraton of the degree of fault of the parties. 9 The divided damages
rule can have more somber consequences for a shipowner whose vessel
is slightly at fault in a collision: he may be required to absorb not only
his own loss but half the difference in the loss suffered by a grossly
negligent vessel. 10 A shocking example of what could occur under the
divided damages rule is illustrated in a hypothetical situation:
A small pleasure craft is operating on Long Island Sound without a proper navigational light. It is involved in a collision with
an oil tanker which is operating at an excessive speed, without a
proper lookout and which executes an illegal navigational maneuver. The pleasure craft is sunk with a total loss of $10,000.
The tanker, whose steering mechanism is damaged, is destroyed on
a breakwater with a loss of $10,000,000.
The divided damages rule would apportion the losses equally despite
the minimal negligence by the pleasure craft, and the pleasure craft
would be obliged to contribute one-half the difference or $4,995,000.11
The divided damages rule was well-intended, 1 2 but the results often
have been less equitable than those which would have occurred at
common law.
The Supreme Court was not totally unmindful of the consequences
which might follow a literal interpretation and strict adherence to the
7. The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873),
8. G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-4 (1957).
9. See "The Atlas," 93 U.S. 302, 313 (1876).
10. Where the least negligent party suffers no loss his liability will be fixed at half
the loss suffered by the more negligent party. The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51,
67 (1873).
11. This figure is arrived at by deducting the lesser amount from the greater amount
and dividing the difference. The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873). A convenient way to calculate is to hold each party liable for half the other's damage and
strike a balance. G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-20 (1957). Thus

in the hypothetical each party is liable for $5,005,000 requiring the pleasure craft to reimburse the tanker for $4,095,000.
12. Donovan and Ray, Mutual Fault-Half-DamagesRule-A CriticalAnalysis, 41
INS. COUN. J. 395, 402 (1974).
Besides the equitable consideration of avoiding the
harshness of comparative negligence, the House of Lords was motivated by a practical
consideration in that they felt apportioning specific degrees of negligence would be an

impossible task. Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395, 400 (H.L. 1824).
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rule in The Catharine v. Dickinson.13 The Pennsylvania 4 involved a
collision between a sailing bark and a large steamer in dense fog off
the coast of New Jersey. Both vessels were in normally heavily-trafficked shipping lanes. The steamer was traveling at an excessive speed
and failed to stop on time to avoid collision. The only fault attributable
to the bark, which was making only one knot, was that it sounded a
bell instead of the statutorily required fog horn, even though evidence
tended to show that the bell could be heard for a greater distance than
the fog horn. The Court, realizing that holding the bark liable under
such circumstances might contribute to an inequitable result, allowed
the first exception to the divided damages rule-a ship technically or
slightly at fault can avoid liability by proving that his breach or omission
in no way contributed to the accident. 15 Mr. Justice Strong reemphasized the strictness of this burden, stating that the Court would not engage in speculation in a violator's behalf and that the standard of proof
was a contribution in "no degree."' 6 Thus the rule of The Pennsylvania did little to alleviate the disquieting implications of the divided
damages rule."
The Martello's illustrates the harshness of the divided damages rule.
and the onerous burden of the Pennsylvania exception. That case involved the sinking of the American barkentine Freda A. Wiley in a
collision with the British steamship Martello in a dense fog. The Martello was found to be primarily responsible for traveling at an excessive
speed under the prevailing conditions and acting too late to avoid the
collision. The Wiley, however, was equipped with a tin fog horn that
had to be blown by a crew member rather than the mechanical device
required by statute. The Court held that every admiralty statutory violation creates a presumption that it was a contributing cause to the accident. 9 As a result, the Wiley was not able to satisfy the oppressive
13. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
14. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
15. Id. at 136.

A ship seeking to avail itself of the "protection" of the Pennsylvania

rule must sustain the burden "of showing not merely that her fault might not have been
one of the causes, or that itprobably was not, but that it could not have been." Id.
at 136.
16. Id. at 137-38.

17. See Daly, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New Course for an Ancient Mar-

iner, 54 B.U.L. REv. 78, 88 (1974). The various rules of navigation were enacted to
insure waterways free of collision and exact the strictest compliance. Admiralty courts
habitually look with disfavor upon the claims of a technically negligent vessel that her
omission could not have contributed in any way to the collision. Relatively few are successful in sustaining this burden.
18. 153 U.S. 64 (1894).
19. Id. at 74. Justice Strong in writing for the majority in The Pennsylvania em-
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burden of exculpation required by The Pennsylvania,0 a burden inconsistent with the flexible and equitable principles upon which admiralty
law is based. 2
Although the Supreme Court has remained implacable in enforcing
the Pennsylvania rule, inroads have been made against its harshness
in the lower federal courts. These advances have not been attained
by changing the basic tenets of the rule. Rather, it seems that some
courts have to some extent relaxed the rigid requirements to successfully sustain the "no possible contribution test" of The Pennsylvania.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Seaboard
Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi,2 2 considered a case involving a collision
between the motor ship Lia and a tug which was on the wrong side
of a ship channel. The tug company argued that the district court had
erred in finding that the Lia had satisfied her burden of proof under
the Pennsylvania rule even after finding that the Lia had not adhered
to statutory requirements.2" The First Circuit preferred to utilize a
standard of "reasonable probabilities,"2 4 finding that the accident would
have taken place regardless of whether the Lia had followed the statu25
tory mandate.
In Permanente Steamship Corp v. The Colorado26 the district court
for the Northern District of California seemed not so much to alter the
stringent requirements of the Pennsylvania rule as to adopt a more liberal attitude in determining what factual components successfully meet
the "no possible contribution" burden. Although both ships involved
phasized that this presumption of contribution will arise every time a ship is in statutory
violation of a rule of navigation.

The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)

125, 136

(1873).
20. The Martello, 153 U.S. 64, 77 (1893).
21. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1827); The Marianna Flora, 24

U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 54 (1826). Both these cases are illustrative of the necessary flexibility and discretion inherent in the admiralty courts to facilitate the rendering of just
and equitable decisions.
22. 213 F.2d 772 (1st Cir. 1954).

23. Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. The Lia, 113 F. Supp. 793, 796 (D. Mass. 1953),
afI'd sub nom., Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi, 213 F.2d 772, 774 (1st Cir. 1954).
24. Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi, 213 F.2d 772, 775 (1st Cir. 1954). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the rule of the Pennsylvania was not to be so
inflexible and rigid as to impose upon a vessel guilty of statutory fault "the burden of
establishing that its fault could not by any stretch of the imagination have had any

causal relation to the collision no matter how speculative, improbable or remote."
Rather the Court of Appeals felt its determination could be based on whether the violation could reasonably be found a contributing cause to the collision. Id. at 775.
25. Id. at 776.

26. 129 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1955), vacated sub nom., State S.S. Co. v. Per-

manente S.S. Corp., 231 F. Supp. 82 (9th Cir. 1956).
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failed to sound their whistles as required by statute, the district court
felt that the obvious cause of the accident was the Colorado's unlawful
crossing of the Silverbow's bow. The Court, persuaded more by justice
than stare decisis, ruled that the failure to sound whistles had no connection with the collision.2 7 This type of a "lip-service" decision may
reach an equitable decision in a single case but does not provide the
stability on which future litigants may rely. The subsequent reversal
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is demonstrative of the
tenuous value of such a decision. This is further evidenced by the ruling of the Second Circuit in the Diesel Tanker F.A. Verdon, Inc., v.
Stakeboat No. 2.28 The tanker F.A. Verdon was under way in New
York Harbor when she collided with the stakeboat. The lower court
awarded full damages to the stakeboat after determining that the tanker
had been traveling at an excessive speed, her lightened condition had
caused her prow to raise, she had no lookout on her bow and, though
her radar was on, her captain did not make use of it. There was also
conflicting testimony as to whether the stakeboat had displayed a white
lantern which was required by statute.2 9 The trial judge felt that no
determination as to the existence of the light could be made. 0 In reversing the decision the Second Circuit stated that the stakeboat must
prove that it was impossible for her conduct to have contributed to the
accident. 8 1 Having failed to prove the existence of the light, she failed
to sustain her burden and was required to bear half of the total damages, 32 even though there was no determinative evidence that the
stakeboat had not complied with statute. The Pennsylvania rule, however, burdens a party, whose sins are admittedly "venial,' 83 with the
27. See Judge Mathes' opinion in reversing the district court for the Northern District of California in State S.S. Co. v. Permanente S.S. Corp., 231 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1956).
28. 340 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965). The Second Circuit has taken a particularly lib-

eral stance in its admiralty decisions.

See Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co.,

214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954); National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 183 F.2d
405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Gulf Oil Corp. v. The John A. Brown, 337 U.S.
919 (1949); The City of Chattanooga, 79 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1935).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 180 (1970), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 180(a) (Supp. 1975):

A vessel under one hundred and fifty feet in length when at anchor shall carry
forward where it can best be seen, but at a height not exceeding twenty feet above
the hull, a white light in a lantern so constructed as to show a clear uniform, and

unbroken light visible all around the horizon at a distance of one mile . ...
30. Diesel Tanker F.A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir.
1965).

31. Id. at 468.
32. Id. at 468-69.
33. Diesel Tanker F.A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir.
1965).
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requirement of affirmatively proving compliance with the statutory pro34
vision.
A more structured attempt to avoid the harshness of the divided
damages rule occurred with the evolution of the "major-minor fault"
doctrine." In selected instances, courts have closed their eyes to the
transgressions of the comparatively innocent party and resolved all
doubts in his favor. 6 There are no reliable guidelines for the time
and circumstances in which courts should utilize this mitigating doc7
trine; therefore, its value as an equitable tool is restricted.1
The genesis of the "major-minor fault" doctrine was the case of The
Great Republic.a8 The Great Republic collided with the Cleona at a
point on the Mississippi River half a mile wide. The Cleona failed to
signal at the required time. The Great Republic, a larger and much
faster ship, was traveling at an excessive speed; was attempting to pass
at a dangerous point without giving the proper signal; was totally mismanaged by her master and had the last clear chance to avoid the immi3
nent peril. Under the earlier decisions of The Catharine
and The
4
Pennsylvania," the Cleona would have been liable though the activities of the Great Republic made her a relatively minor contributor to
the collision. The majority felt that though the Cleona was at fault,
her fault bore "so little proportion to the many faults of the Republic,
that we do not think, under the circumstances, the Cleona should share
the consequences of this collision with the Republic. 14 1 If the "majorminor fault" doctrine were applied with some degree of uniformity, this
would go far in quieting the many criticisms of the divided-damages
rule. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Just two years after
The Great Republic, the Supreme Court held that once it was established that both parties were at fault, either by proof or presumption,
an inquiry into the amount of damages was immaterial, since the damages must be equally divided: application of the divided damages rule
was mandatory not discretionary.4 2 Thus, without distinguishing The
34. Id. at 468-69.
35. The foundation for this doctrine was established in The Great Republic, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
36. The Victory & The Plymothian, 268 U.S. 410, 423 (1897); The Oregon, 158 U.S.
186 (1894).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-4 (1957).
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
The Great Republic, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20, 35 (1874).
The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 313 (1876).
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Great Republic, the Supreme Court thrust the "major-minor fault" doctrine into legal limbo.
Some 20 years after The Great Republic,4" the Court resurrected the
"major-minor fault" doctrine." A collision occurred off the New Jersey coast between the British barque Helen and the American steamship City of New York. The gross negligence of the steamship was
obvious. She was traveling at an excessive speed and failed to stop
until she had located a known danger in fog. The fault of the Helen
was merely a change in course just prior to the collision. The Supreme
Court upheld the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
holding the steamship alone responsible. "
The principles of the "major-minor fault" doctrine seem to conflict
with the precepts of the Pennsylvania rule. The both have, on occasion, given relief to a ship which would ordinarily have been victimized
by the harshness of the divided damages rule,40 but their main contribution to the forum of admiralty jurisprudence has been one of confusion.
Some guidelines have been established by the various federal district
courts. The Third Circuit has held that The Pennsylvania rule is inapplicable when the comparatively blameless party is guilty only of a statutory breach. 4T The Second Circuit has held the "major-minor fault"
doctrine inappropriate in like circumstances.4 The only apparent certainty surrounding these two modifications of the divided damages rule
is that neither of them are appropriate when the technical or minimal
fault involves the breach of a statute. With the abundance of regulatory controls in the field of navigation, 49 it is hard to imagine a situation when either rule can be invoked with any degree of certainty.
A third situation which allows avoidance of the liability imposed by
the divided damages rule occurs in those circumstances characterized
43. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
44. The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893).
45. The City of New York, 35 F. 604, 612 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888), aff'd, 147 U.S.
72, 90 (1893).
46. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873); The Great Republic, 90
U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
47. Tidewater Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 1953).
48. Diesel Tanker F.A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir.
1965).
49. For instance, rules governing navigation of harbors, rivers and inland waters are
specified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1970). Rules for navigation on the Great Lakes
are set out in 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-295 (1970) and their counterpart for the rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico are found at 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-356 (1970).
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as in extremis. This doctrine relieves a master from adhering to the
rules of the maritime road in order to avoid imminent peril."0 To qualify for such an exemption a ship must be placed in a situation where,
through no fault of her own, collision is inevitable." In addition, the
peril must be such as to have arisen so suddenly that the actions of the
master were reasonable evasive measures.5 2 The Supreme Court has
left no doubt that such exceptions to the general rules of navigation
are acceptable only where failure to do so will surely result in a collision.55 The regulations are more than advisory and require strict compliance;54 discretion on the part of the master is seldom tolerated. 5
The in extremis doctrine is more clearly defined than either the Pennsylvania rule or the "major-minor fault" concept, but its worth in mitigating the grave inequities of the divided damages rule is dubious. Although the court will not subject the master to the retroactive test of
whether his action was the most judicious alternative available,5 6 once
the master varies from navigational directives, he acquires a burden of
proving no fault on his part up to the time of his statutory departure. 7
There has been a continuing agitation for change on both the judicial
and legislative level.5 8 The federal district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, for example, has stated that there is no fixed rule
for the division of damages, but that damages could be apportioned according to the particular facts of each case.5, The validity of this bold
nonconformity was not tested, however, since the court was unable to
ascertain the respective degrees of fault and consequently divided the
damages equally.60 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit tem50. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 698 (1893).
51. The Johnson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 146, 153 (1869).
52. See Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264, 268 (3d Cir.

1953).
53.
54.
55.
56.

The Albert Dumois, 177 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1900).
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674. 698 (1893).
Id. at 698.
Wilson v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 276 U.S. 454, 462 (1927).

57. The Johnson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 146, 153 (1869).
58. The federal district court for the Southern District of Alabama has likewise felt
disenchantment with the equal division rule but, like so many other courts, has felt constrained to apply this archaic rule. St. Louis S.F. Ry. v. M/VD Mark, 243 F. Supp.

689. 693 (S.D. Ala. 1965). In addition, Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey,

250 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1957); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d
618 (2d Cir. 1954); and The City of Chattanooga, 79 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1935) all decry

the inequities of the divided damages rule.
The American Bar Association has also advocated congressional legislation abandoning the divided damages rule.

48 A.B.A.J. 366 (1962).

59. Hudson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 263 F. 730, 733 (W.D. Pa. 1911).
60. Id. at 733.
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porarily seized the initiative in this area when confronted with The
Margaret.6' The trial court found that both the Margaretand the Merchant were negligent in causing the collision and applied the divided
damages rule. 2 The circuit court, however, attributed 75 percent of
the cause of the collision to the Merchant and 25 percent to the Mar64
garet63 and entered an appropriately apportioned decree for damages.

On rehearing, however, the court conformed its holding to the rule established by the Supreme Court. 5 In yielding to these "authoritative
pronouncements"6 the Third Circuit proclaimed that it had the power

to order the apportionment, but that it would nevertheless follow the
equal division rule.07

The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has ex-

pressed also its disenchantment with the divided damages rule but has
felt powerless to adhere to any other.6 8

Learned Hand objected to the inequities of the divided damages rule

and also to the confusion resulting from attempts to avoid its harshness."9 In Oriental Trading & TransportationCo. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"0
Judge Hand took an enlightened position, referring to the "major-minor

fault" concept as an "unconscious compensation for the resistance of
the bar and the underwriters to the apportionment of liability" and la-

mented the fact that admiralty collision law was still shackled by such a
"vestigial relic" as the equal damages rule. 71 Hand vigorously dissented
in National Bulk Carriers,Inc. v. United States,72 on the basis that an

61. 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1929).
62. The Margaret, 22 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1927), a! 'd, 30 F.2d 923 (3d
Cir. 1929).
63. 30 F.2d 923, 928 (3d Cir. 1929).
64. Id. at 928.
65. Id. at 928.
66. Id. at 928.
67. Id. at 928.
68. The City of Chattanooga, 79 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1935). The Steamer Chattanooga collided with a tug anchored in a fog. Technically, the tug should not have been
there. The negligence of the steamer was so gross that the court felt "that upon any
just allocation she ought to bear substantially all the loss." Id. at 24. Despite its outraged sense of justice the court felt it had "no alternative but to decree half damages."
Id. at 24.
69. Oriental Trading & Transp. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
70. Id. at 108.
71. Id. at 111.
72. 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). The facts of the
case are illustrative of the gross inequities of the equal damages rule. A collision occurred off the coast of New York between the Rutgers and the Nashbulk. Though conditions were ideal, the Rutgers, operating without a lookout, did not see the Nashbulk
until just prior to the collision. The only fault attributable to the Nashbulk was the
failure to give signal prior to executing a right turn. Despite the Rutgers' gross fault,
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equal division of damages often would be unfair and that such inequities

would not be possible "but for our obstinate cleaving to 73
an ancient rule

which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations.
The Southern District of New York was exposed to the divided damages rule in In re Adam's Petition.74 The court found both ships at
fault and-specifically rejecting an equal apportionment-apportioned
the damages on an 80 percent/20 percent basis.75 On rehearing the
court gave an open and well-reasoned discussion of all the facets and
problems of the divided damages rule. 76 It acknowledged that there was
no precise and totally accurate measure of determining fault but felt
that the want of precise measurement should not cause denial of the
"justice of apportionment. 7 7 The court also took cognizance of the
wide-apread abandonment of its common law counterpart--contributory negligence. 7 It was noted that since admiralty cases are traditionally heard before a judge alone, fear of capricious verdicts provided
79
even less justification for the retention of the divided damages rule.
Finally, the court took cognizance of the "judicially formulated maritime rule of proportional damages in personal injury cases,"" ° suggesting that the 50-year experiment of most major maritime powers with
the comparative damages rule had not led to international chaos.8 ' In
the Nashbulk was burdened by the rule of the Pennsylvania. The court, however, declared that the Nashbulk had satisfied this burden. It reasoned that the signal was required to give notice and since the Rutgers was navigating as one who would not see,
failure to give the signal was not a contributory cause. Hand rejected this most artifical
and temporary easing of the Pennsylvania rule in order to avoid the stem consequences
of the divided damages doctrine. Id. at 409-10.
73. Id. at 410. The Third Circuit has also lamented its powerless position in this
regard. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264, 269 (3d Cir.
1953).
74. 125 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957).
75. Id. at 112-13.
76. Id. at 112.
77. Id. at 113.
78. Id. at 113.
79. Id. at 113.
80. Id. at 113.
81. Id. at 114. This experiment was the international ratification of the Brussels
International Convention of 1910. Article 4 of the Convention provides that:
If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall be in proportion to the degrees of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having
regard to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liabiblity shall be apportioned
equally.

6 E.

BENEDICr, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY

39 (7th ed. 1969).

Most major maritime pow-

ers are now signatories and adherents of the convention. For example, Argentina signed
in 1922, Australia in 1930, Belgium in 1913, Brazil in 1913, Canada in 1914, France
in 1913, Great Britain in 1913, Japan in 1914, and the U.S.S.R. in 1936. For a com-
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In re Adam's Petition,82 however, the Southern District of New York
indicated that the failure of the Second Circuit to adopt a comparative
apportionment rule and the unwillingness of any of the litigants to question the divided damages rule left it no choice but to decree an equal
division.83 Although the court presented a strong and forceful case for
the abandonment of the damages rule, it reluctantly concluded that
even though apportioned damages should be the rule, there was no
choice but to follow the rule of divided damages.8 4
One of the departures from equal apportionment discussed in
Adam's Petition was the apportionment of damages in maritime personal injury cases.85 Such a situation was presented to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ahigren v. Red Star Towing & Trans-

port Co."6 The case involved a suit by a scow captain against a towing
company for injuries received when the tug, without warning, started
into motion and crushed his leg. The captain's leg was hanging over
the edge of the scow in violation of maritime law. The court apportioned the damages according to the degree of fault, holding the equal
damages rule inapplicable in a personal injury suit based on maritime
tort 7 The availability of apportionment in personal injury suits has
also been recognized by the Third Circuit88 in an opinion bemoaning
the court's inability to cure the injustices of the divided damages rule.89
A major foundation for the divided damages rule was that it would
be impossible for courts to apportion damages accurately. 90 Yet the
judiciary has not found the task of apportionment overburdensome in
personal injury cases. Congress has legislated apportionment for railroad employees or their representatives who bring suit against the carrier for personal injury or wrongful death.9 1 The Jones Act provides
similar remedies for seamen injured in the course of their employ-

plete listing of signatory nations see 6 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 38-39 (7th
ed. 1969).
82. 125 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), alf'd, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957).
83. Id.at 115.
84. Id. at 115.
85. Id.at 113.
86. 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
87. Id. at 620-21.

88. Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 487 (3d Cir.
1957).
89. Id. at 488.
90. "The Atlas," 93 U.S. 302, 314 (1876). The difficulty of apportioning damages
influenced the House of Lords when they promulgated divided damages as we know it
in the Western World. Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395, 400 (H.L. 1823).

91. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).

(Federal Employees Liability Act).
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ment. 2 Additionally, comparative negligence has become the law in
over one-third of the states and the trend is gaining momentum. 93 In
applying the comparative negligence concept the court or jury is called
on to make an apportionment of negligence and award damages accordingly. There is no precise formula for arriving at this determination
other than a decision conforming to the facts and evidence adduced at
each trial. Under the United States Constitution the federal judiciary
was specifically granted power over admiralty matters,94 though this
grant was subsequently modified by the savings clause of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.11 This same act provided for the admiralty court to sit
without a jury96 and this practice has generally continued, although a
jury trial may be granted in certain instances on the demand of either
party.97 For over 100 years the federal courts have gained expertise
in handling admiralty matters. The field has been pre-empted by statutory regulations which provide certain standards in which maritime
conduct is to be evaluated. 8 It seems ludicrous to maintain that federal district court judges are unable to equitably apportion damages in
situations similar to those in which juries have performed this task for
years.
A case which created a tempest over the issue of divided damages
was decided by the federal district court for the Northern District of
Illinois in N.M. Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago.9 9 A steam-

ship owned by the libelant collided with a drawbridge owned and operated by the city of Chicago. The ship was negligent in failing to adhere to a municipally established speed limit and in entrusting command to an inexperienced master. The city was negligent in falling
to open the drawbridge and in failing to check the electrical mechanism
of the bridge to ensure it was in a state of good repair. The court's
92.
93.
(1972);
(Supp.

46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
See, e.g., ARK. SrrAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1151 (1944); TEx. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1974-75). For an extensive listing

of comparative negligence states see Comment, Comparative Negligence in Texas, 11
Hous. L. REV. 101, 103 n.19 (1973).
94. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 1

(1970) for a detailed discussion of this specific reservation of power.
95. 1 Stat. 77 (1789). 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) now grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal district courts in in rem admiralty actions. In personam actions may be brought in federal district or state courts.
96. 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
98. See statutes cited note 49 supra.

99. 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).1

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss1/15

12

Davis: Divided Damages - The Albatross of the Modern Mariner.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:258

° ordering an equal
opinion was that the decision in The Catharine'"
division of damages was limited to a situation where the court is unable
to determine the respective degrees of fault. 10 In Patterson, since a
greater degree of the blame could be attributed to the vessel, the court
felt that it was not bound to divide the damages equally: 02 admiralty
jurisdiction carried with it a degree of flexibility to reach just verdicts
where the various degrees of fault were discernible. 0 3 The district
court stated that the Supreme Court had never ordered a division of
damages in any case "where the findings were specific that the respective degrees of contributing fault were unequal ....
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit felt that the district
court had misconceived the impact of The Catharine decision:' 0 5 that
divided damages was to be applied on a finding of "mutual fault" and
not just "equal fault."' 10 6 The Seventh Circuit felt that any changes in
the rule ought to come from Congress--despite the fact that the rule
had evolved from common law originally. The district court's efforts were not in vain, however. They did influence the federal district court for the Northern District of Caliofrnia which refused to subscribe to the divided damages rule,' proclaiming that trial courts are
free to apportion damages unequally where such inequality can be
specifically determined.
If the inequities of the divided damages rule have not been apparent to American jurists, this has not been the case in Great Britain, from
whom we inherited the rule, and most other major maritime powers.
In 1910 the major maritime powers met at the Brussels Collision Liability Convention to reform and add uniformity to maritime collision
law.' 018 Article 4 of the Convention provided for the apportionment
of damages on the basis of degree of fault.' 0 9 Among the subscribers
to the provisions of the Convention are Great Britain, Canada, Mexico,
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor100. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
101. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576, .583 (N.D.
Ill. 1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).

102. Id. at 583.
103. Id. at 586.
104. Id. at 591.

105. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).
106. Id. at 257.

107. McKeel v. Schroeder, 215 F. Supp. 756, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
108. 6 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 37-38 (7th ed. 1969).
109. Id. at 39.
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way, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Russia, Uruguay and
Yugoslavia." 0° The result is that the United States stands alone, among
major maritime powers, clinging to the outdated and archaic rule of divided damages."' The history of the Brussels Convention in this country is a classic example of legislative inactivity and bureaucratic impasse. The United States was represented -at the Convention by a delegation whose official report was submitted to the State Department in
February 1911.112 Nothing substantial was done about the report until
April 1937, when President Roosevelt sent the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported the Convention out of committee with
several proposed reservations in 1939.11 The Convention went unattended on the Senate agenda for the next 8 years; finally, in 1947, Pres1 14
ident Truman withdrew it from consideration.
One reason for the manner in which the Convention languished and
died was the organized and effective opposition of American cargo interest. 115 According to the Convention provisions, an innocent cargo
owner may recover from each vessel involved in the collision only to
the extent that vessel is deemed negligent." 6 United States case law
permits the cargo owner to recover his full loss from either or both parties."' Since the Harter Act excludes recovery against the shipowner
in certain instances"" the cargo owner will often seek redress against
the non-carrying vessel. This would not be permissible under Article
4 of the Convention. A favorite ploy of the cargo interests in assailing
the Convention was to accuse it of being an anti-American tool of foreign shipowners and economic interests, 1 9 and the fact that two world
wars and a period of isolationism occurred during the period in which
110. Id. at 38-39.
111. Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir.
1957).
112. 6 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 38 (7th ed. 1969).
113. Executive Report No. 4, S., 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
114. 6 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 38 (7th ed. 1969).
115. Comment, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the
Brussels Conventions to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens
and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 881 (1955).
116. Brussels Liability Convention art. 4 (1910) as reported in 6 E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 39 (7th ed. 1969) using translation furnished to and utilized by
the United States Senate from 1937-1939.
117. The "Alabama" and the "Game-cock," 92 U.S. 695, 697-98 (1875).
118. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970).
119. Comment, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the

Brussels Conventions to Achieve International Agreement in Collision Liability, Liens
and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 884 (1955).
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the Convention was under consideration lent credence to this type of
argument. Even the American Bar Association refused in 1929 to support reform in the field of admiralty collision law.' 2 ° Subsequently the
A.B.A.'s position did change in 1962 when it went on record supportint House Bill 7911 which was based on the Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910.121 Congressional interest waned, however,
and soon after its introduction the bill died in the House. Its counterpart in the Senate-Bill 2313-was postponed indefinitely because of
1 22
the prolonged debate it was likely to engender.
The United States now stands as the sole major maritime power to
adhere to the divided damages rule. 12 A change is needed to harmonize the practice in the United States with that in the rest of the maritime commercial world. Until such change occurs, admiralty jurisdiction will be afflicted with the abuse of forum shopping as libelants
search for a forum which will grant maximum verdicts or protection.
Such a result cannot contribute anything but confusion to a field which,
because of its international character, requires uniformity.
Even notwithstanding the international implications adherent to the
divided damages rule, the history of the rule in this country has been
one of unfair judgments and shocking verdicts.'
Under the rule a
grossly negligent vessel is almost sure to be able to avoid at least half
the consequences of her actions unless the other party can show flawless conduct on its part. With the widespread and detailed codification of maritime law1 25 even the most diligent mariner may inadvertently find himself in violation of a statute and have the burden of
the divided damages rule thrust upon him. Such a law not only does
120. 54 A.B.A. REP. 278 (1969).

After so many of the great legal minds had de-

plored this now singularly American formula, the resolution of the Bar in 1929 is most

perplexing:

Be it resolved, By this Association, that as the present maritime law of the
United States relative to a division of damages in collision cases has operated satisfactorily for a long number of years, no change in such law should be approved

by this Association.
Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
121.

48 A.B.A.J. 366 (1962).

H.R. Bill 7911 would have abandoned the divided

damages rule in favor of an apportionment theory. It received no further consideration
after its introduction and was subsequently reintroduced in early 1963 as H.R. 109 but
nothing came of it.
122. S. 2313, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962).
123. Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, 910

(E.D. Va. 1959).
124. See The Martello, 153 U.S. 64 (1894); The City of Chattanooga, 79 F.2d 23
(2d Cir. 193.5) for examples of shocking results under the divided damages rule.
125. See statutes cited note 49 supra,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 1, Art. 15

1975]

COMMENTS

not promote careful navigation, but it also cannot help but engender
a certain disrespect for the law among those cognizant of admiralty
matters.
The chances of any reform in the divided damages rule through legislative action is remote. Although most Americans would be appalled

by the verdicts which often result from an application of the divided
damages rule, few are aware of the implications of this aspect of admiralty law. Yet in an era where America imports much of her energy
fuel and when her imports far exceed her exports, admiralty law affects

every citizen and consumer. Nonetheless, a Congress beset with the
problems of inflation, recession, energy independence, and tax reform
is not likely to devote much attention to admiralty reform even though
the situation has and still demands attention. The times and the bulki-

ness of the legislative process weigh against any reasonable expectation
of reform by legislative fiat.
The alternative for reform lies with the judiciary. The Supreme
Court could remedy the problem of the divided damages merely by

changing its 120-year old position. 12 6 The Court created a law which
fit the contingencies of 1850 maritime activities, and there is no reason

why it could not now revise the law to conform to present realities. As

early as 1827 the Court proclaimed that "the award of damages always
rests in the sound discretion of the Court, under all circumstances.'2 7

The situation regarding the United States' adherence to the divided
damages rule is at once both comic and pathetic.

The lower federal

courts object to the inequities of the rule but confess their inability to
126. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854). The
impetus for change probably will not come from the lower federal courts. To date judicial dissatisfaction with the rule has not reached that "degree of articulateness" which

usually presages change.

G. GILMORE & C.

BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY

§ 7-20

(1957). The Supreme Court itself has reacted to the inequities of the divided damages
rule with its development of the rule of the Pennsylvania and the "major-minor fault"
concept. The rule was adopted at a time when it was natural for a fledgling judiciary
to look to the established law of Great Britain for guidance. Great Britain has aban-

doned the divided damages concept.

6 E.

BENEDICT,

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY

37

(1957). It would take a great deal of care and application to properly apportion damages in admiralty cases and the lack of precise measurements would undoubtedly lead
to some inaccurate judgments. However, this should not be a deterrent when it is considered that the present system divides the damages in a dogmatic and inequitable manner.
127. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1827) (emphasis added). In 1890
the Court held that contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery for personal injury in an admiralty suit. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890). The Max Morris
is most significant, however, for what it did not expressly say. The Court did not rule
that damages must be divided. id. at 15.
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128
do anything to change it.
This situation is even more perplexing
considering that it was the lower federal courts which originally
adopted the divided damages rule.' 29 If divided damages had become
the law by legislative enactment then there would be validity to the
claims of the lower federal bench that Congressional action is needed
to repeal it. Since the rule comes from common law, however, it is
subject to judicial revocation.

Until recently the Supreme Court showed no disposition to act. But
in 1972 the Court considered the case of Union Oil Co. v. The San
Jacinto"' and reversed a decision awarding divided damages in a collision case. The Court found the cause of the collision attributable solely
to the tug San Jacinto. The majority felt that since only one ship was
at fault there was "no occasion to consider how damages should be apportioned were both vessels at fault.""' Theinference was clear that
the Court was now ready to consider abandonment of the divided damages rule. Amazingly, nearly 2 years passed before this invitation
was accepted. In Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States 32 the federal
district court had found the Mary A. Whalen, Reliable's tanker, guilty
of 75 percent of the negligence and the United States Coast Guard 25
percent responsible for the accident which resulted in the Mary Whalen
becoming stranded on a sand bar." 3 The circuit court equated stranding cases with collision and specifically refused to abandon the divided
damages rule."' Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court has an
opportunity to move America into the mainstream of international
maritime law and to redress the harsh inequities of 210 years of divided damages. By adopting a comparative apportionment of dam128. See, e.g., N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254, 25758 (7th Cir. 1963); Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488
(3d Cir. 1957); Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264, 268-69
(3d Cir. 1952).
129. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854). In

the landmark decision Justice Nelson remarked that divided damages was already the
law in the district and circuit courts. Id. at 177. For examples of pre-Catharinecases
which applied divided damages see The John Henry, 13 Fed. Cas. 684 (D. Me. 1860),
The Scioto, 11 Fed. Cas. 774 (D. Me. 1847).

130. 409 U.S. 140 (1972).
-

131. Id. at 147.
132. 53 F.R.D. 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aif'd, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 491, - L. Ed. 2d - (1974).

133. Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036, 1037 (2d Cir.), cert.

granted, -

U.S. -,

95 S. Ct. 491, -

L. Ed. 2d -

(1974).

The memorandum opinion

of the district court gives no facts surrounding its decision but deals merely with a question of discovery extraneous to this topic.
134. Id. at 1038.
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275

ages the Court can insure safer navigation on United States waters by making all mariners fully responsible for their own actions. But
the Supreme Court must seize this opportunity and clearly change the
law. Timidity and equivocation would indefinitely still the voices on
the lower bench and in admiralty practice which have, in a spirit of
equity and diligence to duty, advocated change.
Note: Alter this comment went to press, the Supreme Court abrogated the divided
damages rule in a well written opinion which concurs with the reasoning expressed herein.
United States v. Reliable Transfer, 43 U.S.L.W. 4610 (U.S. May 19, 1975).-Ed.
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